Dr. Gerrit J. Gonschorek

Kontakt

• E-Mail: gerrit.gonschorek@vwl.uni-freiburg.de
• Curriculum Vitae 

Publikationen

• Originalarbeiten in wissenschaftlichen Fachzeitschriften
• Monographien
• Buchbeiträge
• Sonstige Publikationen

Originalarbeiten in wissenschaftlichen Fachzeitschriften

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2020

• Gonschorek, Gerrit
  Subnational Favoritism in Development Grant Allocations – Empirical Evidence from Decentralized Indonesia
  2020 IEP Discussion Paper Series, University of Freiburg, Nummer: 38
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  Kurzfassung

  Are public grant allocations biased toward the birth districts of governors, and, if so, what explains this favoritism? The allocation of budget authority to local government officials is a common trend around the developing world, but it is often criticized for transferring favoritism from the center to lower government levels. Using a unique panel data set of 410 Indonesian districts for the period 2005–2013, I exploit the discretionary nature of a government grant and data from a large amount of asynchronous local direct elections to investigate whether the birthplace of the provincial governor determines fund allocation to the district level. I show that birth districts of incumbent governors receive significantly larger shares of discretionary grants compared with the other districts within a province. I find that local favoritism is driven by governors with political history in the district office of their birth district and is limited by local electoral accountability. Classical pork-barrel politics, however, as reelection motives or formal political party ties to the district administration, do not explain local favoritism. These results illustrate the importance of non-discretionary institutional grant design and local democratization reforms in Indonesia’s political system. The country is a young democracy characterized by low ideological cleavages, little party loyalty, and the prevalence of money politics in its decentralized fiscal system. These features characterize a number of developing countries, yet contrast sharply to the established democracies for which subnational favoritism has been analyzed.
  
  
   
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2018

• Gonschorek, Gerrit, Schulze, Günther G.
  Continuity or Change? Indonesia’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer System under Jokowi
  2018 J Southeast Asian St, Band: 35, Nummer: 2, Seiten: 143 - 164
• Gonschorek, Gerrit, Schulze, Günther G., Sjahrir, Bambang S.
  To the ones in need or the ones you need? The Political Economy of Central Discretionary Grants: Empirical Evidence from Indonesia
  2018 Eur J Polit Econ, Band: 54, Seiten: 240 - 260

Monographien

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2023

• Routledge
  The Political Economy of Redistribution in Indonesia. Political Patronage and Favoritism in Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer Allocations
  ISBN: 9781032299457
  Gonschorek, Gerrit J.
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  Kurzfassung

  This book analyses how different institutional intergovernmental transfer designs influence patronage and favoritism in public fund allocations in Indonesia. Presenting original research and investigating existing theories on the determinants of public fund allocations, the book uses Indonesia as a case study. Indonesia, often claimed to be characterized by money politics, provides an ideal setting for this analysis. The countries' decentralized fiscal system consists of various institutional intergovernmental transfer designs allocating public funds to a large variety of districts to finance public service provision. The author exploits those distinctive differences between various institutional intergovernmental transfer designs and investigates their influence on the prevalence of favoritism and patronage in public funds allocations while holding the political system, the observation period, and the government officials involved constant. A valuable contribution to the literature on the political economy of redistribution, this book will be of interest to academics working on economics and political science, particularly in public finance and development economics, but also in development studies or Southeast Asian studies.

2021

• Faculty for Economics and Behavioral Sciences
  The Political Economy of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Why Institutional Design Matters - Evidence from Decentralized Indonesia
  Gonschorek, Gerrit

Buchbeiträge

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2019

• Schulze G, Gonschorek G
  Continuity or Change? Indonesia’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer System under Jokowi
  In: The Indonesian Economy in Transition: Policy Challenges in the Jokowi Era and Beyond
  2019, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Hal Hill, Siwage Dharma Negara, Seiten: 87 - 120, Hal Hill, Siwage Dharma Negara, ISBN: ISBN: 978-981-4843-06-5

Sonstige Publikationen

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2021

• Gonschorek, Gerrit
  Rules versus Discretion: Empirical Evidence from Indonesia’s Intergovernmental Transfer System
  IEP Discussion Paper Series, University of Freiburg, Nummer: 40, 2021

2020

• Gonschorek, Gerrit J.
  Subnational Favoritism in Development Grant Allocations –Empirical Evidence from Decentralized Indonesia
  IEP Discussion Paper Series, University of Freiburg, Nummer: 38, 2020

2018

• Gonschorek, Gerrit J., Sjahrir, Bambang S., Schulze, Günther G.
  To the ones in need or the ones you need? The Political Economy of Central Discretionary Grants − Empirical Evidence from Indonesia
  IEP Discussion Paper Series, University of Freiburg, Nummer: 36, 2018